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Abstract 
Improving the quality of agricultural products is crucial for facilitating sustainable 
agricultural development. One widely embraced approach is contract farming, which 
generates guarantees – necessary for sustaining the continuous operations of vulnerable 
farmers – while enabling manufacturers to manage the aggregate supply chain risks and 
prices. Although management researchers have investigated power and quality 
performance issues between organisations, few have examined their impact on contract 
farming. This paper extends the literature by examining the relationships between power, 
supply chain integration and the quality performance of agricultural products, from the 
perspectives of farm households and agribusiness companies in contract farming. This 
study proposes and empirically examines a model, applying survey data from 78 
agricultural companies and 321 peasant householders in China. The results show that 
different types of power have different effects on contract farming. In particular, non-
economic power significantly and positively affects supply chain integration. Its impact 
on process coordination is greater than its impact on information sharing. The effect of 
economic power on supply chain integration is different from the binary perspective. 
These findings have positive theoretical and practical significance for agribusiness and 
will help farmers to improve the quality of primary agricultural products and achieve 
sustainable agricultural development. 
 





In the context of globalisation, efforts to improve the quality of agricultural products are 
receiving increasing attention (Matos and Hall, 2007; Mangla et al., 2018). Notably, in 
most developing countries, such as China, Thailand and India, the development of 
agricultural products is being revolutionised more rapidly than anywhere else in the world 
(Zhao et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2014, Jia et al., 2018). Accordingly, contract farming is a 
growing practice in first world countries, as well as developing countries (Jin et al., 2015; 
Baluch et al., 2017). It is defined as ‘a system for the production and supply of agricultural 
product under forward contracts with the essence of such contracts being a commitment 
to provide an agricultural commodity of a type, at a time and price, and in the quantity 
required by a known buyer’ (Singh, 2002).  
 
Studies show that contract farming is a new approach to supply chain integration that 
rewards all of its participants (Matos and Hall, 2007; Jin et al., 2015; Zainol et al., 2019). 
In particular, it offers important guarantees to vulnerable farmers, allowing them to 
maintain their processes and operations, which is an essential socio-economic objective 
in developing countries (Wang et al., 2014). In the supply chain, the relationship between 
companies and farmers is essentially an upstream relationship. The suppliers (farmers) 
supply products or resources to the buyers (companies), who purchase them according to 
contracts with pre-agreed prices. Key benefits of contract farming, which support its 
application in supply chain integration include suppliers’ improved productivity and 
enhanced access to high-end markets, the promotion of buyers’ marketing activities and 
increased total revenue and reduced supply uncertainty for both suppliers and buyers 
(Cachon and Lariviere, 2005; Lehoux et al., 2014; Moazzam et al., 2018). In addition, 
contract farming is a rapidly increasing practice in first world countries (Otsuka et al., 
2016). Research efforts from the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Canada, Japan and 
the United States all show that applying contract farming improved supply chain 
efficiency (Wang et al., 2014; Niu et al., 2016). For example, Wang et al. (2014) identify 
that contract farming can accelerate the application of new production technologies, 
reduce supply chain risk and improve production outcome at less expense. 
 
Using contract farming to facilitate supply chain integration is unique to China, since it 
is different from general supply chain relationships in empirical studies (Yeung et al., 
4 
 
2009; Liu et al., 2013). This type of one-to-many relationship between farmers and 
companies can be considered a collaboration between single agricultural enterprises, as 
legal entities, and multiple farmers, as natural persons (Fu et al., 2017). This unique 
relationship determines the unequal positions and power of its participants (Zhao et al., 
2008). China’s national culture features by collectivism and a high power distance, which 
makes it an extremely unique context for exploring issues associated with different types 
of power and contract farming for supply chain integration. Therefore, this study proposes 
a model to examine the relationships between types of power, supply chain integration 
and quality performance of agricultural products in the context of contract farming. It 
addresses the following questions: 
Q1: How do different types of power affect the implementation of supply chain 
integration? 
Q2: How does supply chain integration influence the quality performance of 
agricultural products? 
To address these research questions, this study analysed contract farming, at a system 
level, through two independent surveys of agricultural companies and farmers influenced 
by agricultural industrialisation. Previous studies by Fu et al. (2013a 2013b; 2014; 2017) 
have proposed the existing knowledge on the implementation of contract farming in the 
agricultural sector by suggesting a preliminary “A company + farmers” model to facilitate 
supply chain management process. However, the main research objectives, data sources 
and approaches are different from our proposed study. More specifically, Fu et al. (2013a) 
introduced the preliminary ‘a company + farmers’ model and explored the relationships 
between trust, relationship commitment and information sharing through empirical 
testing based on the buyer’s (company’s) perspective. Then, Fu et al. (2013b) examined 
the model by studying the stability of the alliance from the perspective of the suppliers 
(farmers). Fu et al. (2014) further tested the model based on how agricultural firms’ power 
affected farmers’ trust and relationship commitment, as well as the social responsibilities 
along entire supply chains with the aim of improving productivity and reducing costs (Fu 
et al. 2017). In short, although these related studies conducted empirical analyses to gain 
a better understanding of the ‘a company + farmers’ model for effective agricultural 
supply chain management, they were focused on different aspects (e.g. trust, relationship 
commitment and social responsibility) from a single perspective (i.e. either from the 
farmers’ or the companies’ perspective). Thus, the effects of power on contract farming 
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for supply chain integration and their relationship to quality performance of agricultural 
products remains unknown. Accordingly, the main purpose of this research is to extend 
the previous work (2013a 2013b; 2014; 2017) by further recasting and augmenting the 
conceptual basis of the ‘a company + farmers’ model through two independent surveys 
of agricultural companies and farmers influenced by agricultural industrialisation. The 
relevance of this research comes from the direct applicability of its processes to real 
agricultural supply chain business problems that both farmers and companies face. 
 
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature and proposes six 
important hypotheses. Section 3 illustrates the methodology applied in this study. Section 
4 details the data analysis and presents the findings. Section 5 discusses the findings 
regarding the relationships among power, supply chain integration and quality 
performance of products in contract farming. Section 6 concludes the study by 
highlighting the implications of the research and providing directions for future study. 
2. Literature review and research hypotheses 
This section concerns the comprehensive study of literature surrounding types of power 
in contract farming and the constructs within contract farming that affect the quality 
performance of agricultural products. Each of these components is discussed in the 
following sections, with hypotheses about how they are related. 
2.1. Types of power in contract farming 
Power, in this context, refers to the ability of one party to influence the decision-making 
of another party during collaboration (Brown et al., 1995). The fundamental concept of 
power has been a critical theme for research in organisational behaviour (Jackson and 
Carter, 2007; Mast, 2010). A study by French and Raven (1959) investigated power in 
various empirical contexts over approximately 50 years. For example, party member A 
relies on advantages in information, technology and capital to influence party member B. 
Thus, B is compelled to act to meet A’s expectations. A is not the manager of B, but A 
influences B to a certain extent, which means that A uses power on B. Power is not a 
unidimensional concept. Etgar and Michael’s (1978) typology describes power in terms 
of two types, namely non-economic and economic power, which play the role of ‘carrot’ 




There are two main types of power as non-economic power and economic power. On the 
one hand, non-economic power refers to when a party induces another party to comply 
with its desired activities with an inducement method, such as the provision of favourable 
information and technical guidance (Maloni and Benton, 2000). For example, from 
farmers’ perspective, the company may have knowledge and skills, such as how to plant 
high-quality and safe agricultural products, make new products adapted to the local 
environment and achieve superior production effects. This gives the company the 
authority to influence the farmers. In contrast, farmers may have expertise in producing 
better products. Thus, the company allows the farmers to do business according to the 
farmers’ demands (as part of the relationship between farmers and companies). Most of 
the time, the non-economic power allows the farmers to decide whether they will be 
affected by a company, and how much. Farmers seek alliances with companies according 
to their perceptions of how a company’s expertise, reputation, knowledge and 
technologies will affect them (Brown et al., 1995; Zhao et al., 2008).  
 
On the other hand, economic power refers to when a party has the ability to mediate 
rewards or punishment to another party. For example, from farmers’ perspective, the 
company may have the ability to offer farmers attractive incentives (e.g. advanced 
technical support, excellent breeding varieties, great acquisition prices or more services) 
and to punish or threaten the farmers (e.g. reduce or even cancel transactions, reduce 
transaction volumes or threaten farmers with cancelling a preferential offer). Meanwhile, 
farmers may also have the right to offer rewards that are beneficial to the company (e.g. 
the farmer can choose to provide more business to the company) or to issue punishments 
that are unfavourable to the company (e.g. withdraw or decrease the capacity of business 
with the company). However, given the fact that most of the world’s farms are small and 
family run businesses (Lowder et al., 2016), the economic power of farmers tends to be 
limited. Thus, this type of power is regarded as being mediated because its adoption is 
mainly managed by the company, which may reward farmers by generating positive 
outputs (such as placing buyer orders), or punish farmers through negative outputs (such 
as withdrawing an order) (Etgar and Michael, 1978; Maloni and Benton, 2000). The 
company, as the power source, decides whether to apply its right to affect farmers’ 
behaviour and, if so, when and how it will be applied (Fu et al., 2014). 
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2.2 Contract farming for supply chain integration 
In terms of managing agricultural supply chains, contract farming is a type of vertical 
supply chain integration, which enables farmers and companies to achieve ‘win-win’ 
situations (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Saenger et al., 2013). Supply chain integration 
refers to an across the board integration of a firm’s internal functions like production, 
logistics and R&D, and all of the external networks, involving downstream consumers 
and upstream suppliers (Huo et al., 2014). Although several studies have investigated the 
different functional sides of supply chain integration, only a few have examined it from 
a contract farming perspective. Accordingly, this study integrates the supply chain 
integration and contract farming perspective and define the concept as the extent to which 
farmers and companies’ external networks and internal functions operationally and 
strategically collaborate with each other to produce high quality of products at low costs. 
This is an extension of the supply chain integration concept. 
 
Literature related to contract farming has, in the past, generally investigated the practice 
as a unidimensional measurement (Asokan and Singh, 2003; Barrett et al., 2012). Recent 
studies identify a way for measuring the effectiveness of contract farming for supply 
chain integration according to two criteria as process coordination and information 
sharing (Ariffin et al., 2015; Zainol et al., 2019). Process coordination refers to integrative 
activities among participants to enhance the overall supply chain efficiency, and 
information sharing refers to the sharing of critical information across the supply chain 
network (Prajogo and Olhager, 2012). Supply chain managers argue that process 
coordination and information sharing can result in practical supply chain efforts 
(Williams et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2015), but their effects on the quality performance of 
products in agricultural supply chains are not clear. As highlighted by Liu et al. (2015), 
the alleged operational advantages of supply chain integration vary significantly across 
studies. This divergence of research findings is associated with different assumptions and 
supply chain constructs, which can lead to inconsistencies wherein researchers apply the 
results of one situation to a different situation (Zhao et al., 2008; Wong et al., 2015). 
2.3 Quality performance of agricultural products 
Agricultural product quality conventionally plays an important role in nearly all 
agricultural businesses (Zhao et al., 2008; Mangla et al., 2018). In the light of the 
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consumers’ increasing concerns about food quality, the degree to which firms can manage 
or even enhance their market competitiveness in the future will critically rely on their 
capability to successfully satisfy customers’ requirement for high-quality agricultural 
products (Otsuka et al., 2016). In this study, to consistent with the supply chain integration 
and contract farming perspectives, quality performance of agricultural products was 
measured by improved product quality, improved production costs, reduced investments 
of fixed assets and reduced capital investments (Huo et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2017). 
Particularly, contract farming offers a novel approach to controlling complicated 
production procedures, with better performance than is possible with arm’s-length 
transactions (Krishnan et al., 2004; Mangla et al., 2018). This leads to better product 
quality, more secured production and lower marketing and processing expenses (Baihaqi 
and Sophal, 2013; Moazzam et al., 2018). According to Wang et al. (2014), in some 
developing (or transition) economies, contract farming can deal with imperfections in 
output and input markets and organisational shortages by offering farmers market access, 
credit, raw materials, technology services and human capital.  
 
Existing literature provides various analyses regarding contract farming and the 
performance of agricultural products in supply chains. Most studies suggest that contract 
farming can improve the performance of overall supply chain outputs (Krishnan et al., 
2004; Alexander et al., 2007; Cachon and Kok 2010; Saenger et al., 2013; Niu et al., 
2016; Moazzam et al., 2018). For example, Krishnan et al. (2004) investigated retailers’ 
promotional efforts in collaboration contracts for decentralised supply chains. This 
investigation demonstrated that a buy-back contract with a promotional cost-sharing 
agreement can improve the overall supply chain quality. Alexander et al. (2007) 
performed an analysis of the US agribusiness industry and identified that contract farming 
improves overall product quality but that its performance can be affected by different 
financial incentives. Cachon and Kok (2010) investigated supply chain performance 
under various circumstances and suggest that downstream supply chain participants are 
better off in contracts, considering the presence of competing suppliers in supply chains. 
Chiu et al. (2011) explored how targeted sales rebate contracts can influence supply chain 
performance in different situations. Through studying the Vietnamese dairy industry, 
Saenger et al. (2013) found that contract farming practices drive farmers to greater 
agricultural inputs, leading to enhanced product quality. Wang et al. (2014) offer a 
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comprehensive review of the empirical literature on contract farming in both developing 
and developed countries and further confirm the positive relationship between contract 
farming and quality performance of products. Niu et al. (2016) explored how different 
contract structures could be improved—to result in a win-win situation for supply chain 
parties. Moazzam et al. (2018) proposed a collaborative framework for better evaluating 
agri-food supply chain performance. 
2.4. The relationship between power and contract farming for supply chain 
integration 
Contract farming is a novel practice of vertical supply chain integration that benefits both 
farmers and companies (Matos and Hall, 2007; Jin et al., 2015; Zainol et al., 2019). 
According to Zhao et al. (2008), supply chain integration refers to the degree to which an 
organisation strategically collaborates with its supply chain partners and manages intra-
and inter-organisation processes to achieve effective and efficient flows of products, 
services, information, money and decisions, with the objective of providing maximum 
value to its customers. Studies of supply chain integration explicitly identify two aspects 
of the chain: information sharing and process coordination (Prajogo and Olhager, 2012; 
Zainol et al., 2016). Supply chain integration requires parties to consider both process 
coordination and information sharing, not only one or the other (Williams et al., 2013; 
Wong et al., 2015). Greater degrees of integration are achieved by facilitating the 
collaboration of supply chain efforts among all parties, improved communication and 
more blurred distinctions between the supply chain efforts of the company and those of 
its consumers and suppliers (Prajogo and Olhager, 2012; Liu et al., 2015). This study 
focuses on contract farming for supply chain integration, which refers to farmers 
establishing a strategic, cooperative partnership with companies and participating in their 
design and production process to achieve production efficiency, accelerate supply chain 
response and meet the needs of customers. In particular, it aims to offer insight into the 
value of process coordination and information sharing through various types of power. 
 
Studies show that non-economic power enhances supply chain cooperation and promotes 
positive attitudes towards supply chain integration (Brown et al., 1995; Park et al., 2017). 
This facilitates consistency in norms and values among participants (Frazier et al. 1986; 
Benton and Maloni, 2005). Fu et al. (2014) identified that non-economic power can 
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further improve the performance of supply chain integration by enhancing the degree of 
effective process coordination and information sharing. This supports the argument of 
this study that both process coordination and information sharing are vital for contract 
farming in supply chain integration. For instance, when a company uses non-economic 
power on farmers, it is usually to change the behaviours or attitudes of the farmers by 
providing knowledge and support. In other words, its mechanism is that the farmers will 
receive benefits if they are obedient (Lusch and Brown, 1982; Zhao et al., 2008). Thus, 
affected farmers will feel that their autonomy, in decision-making and behaviour, is 
respected (Scheer and Stern, 1992; Maloni and Benton, 2000). They will make positive 
changes to benefit the company, then promote the quality of their relationship (Park et 
al., 2017). This pushes farmers to be more willing to integrate with the company through 
improved process coordination and information sharing. In particular, in contract 
farming, companies provide professional technical guidance and support to farmers (e.g. 
specialised feeds, seedlings, medicines, vaccines and technician visits on a regular basis), 
while cultivating still stronger non-economic power, which can convince farmers of a 
company’s professional influence and strengthens farmers’ information exchange with 
that company (Yeung et al., 2009). This also encourages farmers to actively participate 
in the short and long-term planning processes of the company, which promotes farmers’ 
information sharing and process coordination with the company. The situation is the same 
from the company’s perspective. For example, by offering farmers proper training (e.g. 
Six Sigma) and supporting them to start their own projects, companies gain useful skills 
and information from the farmers as well. Therefore, this study proposed: 
H1: the use of non-economic power is positively related to information sharing in 
the company–farmer relationship. 
H2: the use of non-economic power is positively related to process coordination 
in the company–farmer relationship. 
 
In contrast, the constant application of economic power has been identified as affecting 
relational norms negatively (Frazier et al. 1986; Benton and Maloni, 2005) and lowering 
the strength of relationships between farmers and companies in supply chain integration 
(Brown et al., 1995; Fu et al., 2014). For example, if a company changes the behaviours 
or attitudes of its partners (farmers) mainly through incentives, threats or punishments, 
then the company is using economic power on the farmers. Its mechanism is that farmers 
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will suffer an inevitable loss if they fail to comply (Kumar and Scheer, 1998). To affected 
farmers, this would feel as if the company was creating trouble and preventing them from 
achieving their goals (Frazier and Rody, 1991; Maloni and Benton, 2000). If farmers 
change their behaviour under these circumstances, it is often out of frustration. Therefore, 
the application of economic power by a company will destroy the cooperative atmosphere 
between farmers and that company. In addition, economic power exerts a negative 
influence on the supply chain relationship between companies and famers (Frazier and 
Rody, 1991; Fu et al., 2014, Zhao et al., 2018). As a result, these two parties will share a 
tense atmosphere, which would not be conducive for information sharing and process 
coordination and may even cause conflict between them (Prajogo and Olhager, 2012). 
 
In addition, because supply chain integration requires that a company invest its efforts 
(e.g. knowledge, technology and assets) in a relationship, this may lead to opportunism 
among farmers (Wang et al., 2014). Thus, transaction costs can increase as the company 
introduces governance practices to prevent against opportunistic behaviour (Cheng and 
Sheu, 2012). This can further cause deterioration in supply chain process coordination 
and information sharing. Therefore, the adoption of economic power is in opposition to 
the normative supply chain integration, which establishes satisfying process coordination 
and information sharing. Accordingly, this study proposed: 
H3: the use of economic power has a negative effect on information sharing in the 
company–farmer relationship. 
H4: the use of economic power has a negative effect on process coordination in 
the company–farmer relationship. 
2.5. The relationship between contract farming and quality performance of 
agricultural products 
The concept of contract farming for supply chain integration is related to information and 
process flow of raw materials from farmers, which enable companies to maintain an 
effective production procedure (Jin et al., 2015). Such collaboration creates a close 
connection between the two parties in a way that makes the boundary of activities less 
distinct (Williams et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2015). When farmers participate in a company’s 
supply chain integration, the company can help farmers grasp market dynamics and 
market development trends in a timely manner, which helps farmers understand and meet 
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the changing needs of consumers; for example, farmers may pay more attention to the 
quality of agricultural products (Wang et al., 2014). Meanwhile, process coordination 
would reduce the company’s cost of monitoring the production of agricultural products 
and make the farmers cooperate with the company in an atmosphere of mutual trust, 
which would positively affect the quality performance of agricultural products (Lehoux 
et al., 2014; Otsuka et al., 2016). 
 
Studies also demonstrate that solid integration via process coordination and information 
sharing can mitigate different supply chain issues, such as the bullwhip effect (Prajogo 
and Olhager, 2012; Niu et al., 2016). For example, contract farming enables companies 
to apply lean production methods which feature reduced waste, improved efficiency and 
increased productivity. In this research, quality performance of agricultural products 
mainly refers to the safety and quality level of agricultural products, which means that 
farmers may produce safe agricultural products that meet quality standards with the least 
labour, material and financial resources, while cooperating with the company. The 
empirical results show that adopting contract farming for supply chain integration enables 
companies and farmers to behave like a single entity, which can lead to improved quality 
performance of products produced across the entire chain (Wang et al., 2014; Cachon and 
Lariviere, 2005; Lehoux et al., 2014; Moazzam et al., 2018). In addition, many 
operational benefits have been identified, such as reductions in uncertainties, costs and 
lead time, as well as enhancement in service levels, product distribution and sales and 
customer satisfaction (Matos and Hall, 2007; Jin et al., 2015; Baluch et al., 2017; Zainol 
et al., 2019). Thus, this study proposed: 
H5: information sharing has a positive effect on the quality performance of 
agricultural products in the company–farmer relationship. 
H6: process coordination has a positive effect on the quality performance of 
agricultural products in the company–farmer relationship. 
 
Building on the literature review, a theoretical model (Figure 1) can be used to depict the 
hypotheses and examine the relationships between types of power, supply chain 














Figure 1: The conceptual model of this study 
3. Research methodology 
3.1. Questionnaire design 
This study analysed contract farming at a system level through two independent surveys 
of farmers (farm-level data) and agricultural companies (firm-level data) influenced by 
agricultural industrialisation. The questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part 
included the demographic characteristics of the participants, such as age, corporation time 
and corporation stage for farmers and number of cooperative farmers, ownership, 
cooperation time and stage for companies. The second part included the subjective 
variables. A 7-point Likert scale was used. Each variable had more than three items. To 
ensure the validity of the contents, five constructs were measured, which were all adapted 
from existing literature. For further information, please refer to Appendices A and B, 
which contain the questionnaires for companies and farmers, respectively. 
 
Economic power and non-economic power, which were adapted from Brown et al. (1995) 
and Zhao et al. (2008), were measured separately, according to three items. Contract 
farming for supply chain integration is subdivided into two dimensions, namely, 
information sharing and process coordination, which were adapted from Morash and 
Clinton (1998) and Narasimhan and Kim (2002). Three items were also used to measure 
information sharing and another three for process coordination. Quality performance of 
agricultural products was adapted from Huo et al. (2014) and Fu et al. (2017). To ensure 
that the scale was appropriate for Chinese rural situations, all items were translated from 
English to Chinese and back-translated from Chinese to English. After the 
transformations, the questionnaires were pilot tested with a sample of 20 farmers and 15 
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companies, before the full-scale launch of the survey. Table 1 shows the measurement 
items and their sources.  
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    Table 1: Measurement items 
Constructs Measures Sources  




The farmers understand what they are doing 
(CNP1). 
The company understands what it is doing (FNP1). Brown et al. (1995);  
Zhao et al. (2008) 
The business knowledge of the farmers is likely 
to make the farmers do the right thing (CNP2). 
Business knowledge may make the company suggest to 
do things right (FNP2). 
The farmers have received specialised training 
and can recognise and take necessary actions 
(CNP3). 
The company has received specialised training and can 
recognise and take the necessary actions (FNP3). 
Economic power  If the company does not comply with the 
requirements of farmers, the company will not be 
treated well by them (CEP1). 
If the farmers did not do what as the company asked, the 
farmers would not have received very good treatment 
from the company (FEP1). 
If the farmers find that the company does not 
follow their requirements, the farmers will 
retaliate in some way (CEP2). 
If the company found that the farmers do not obey it, the 
company will retaliate in some way (FEP2). 
The farmers often imply that if the company does 
not meet their requirements, the farmers will take 
some actions to reduce the company’s profits 
(CEP3). 
The company often hints that if the farmers do not obey 
it, it will take some actions to reduce the farmers’ profits 
(FEP3). 
Information Sharing  The company shares sales information with the 
farmers (CIF1). 
The farmers share sales information with the company 
(FIF1). 
Morash and Clinton 
(1998); Narasimhan 
and Kim (2002) The company shares the inventory information 
of products with the farmers in the process of 
planting and breeding (CIF2). 
The farmers share inventory information with the 
company (FIF2). 
The company shares the production planning 
information with the farmers in the process of 
planting and breeding (CIF3). 
The farmers share the plan information of means of 
production (chemical fertiliser, pesticides, veterinary 
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Constructs Measures Sources  
Company’s perspective Farmers’ perspective 
 
drugs, feed, etc.) with the company in the process of 
planting and breeding (FIF3). 
Process 
Coordination 
The company monitors the production process 
together with farmers (CPC1). 
The farmers monitor the production process together 
with the company (FPC1). 
 
The company establishes and maintains the 
performance appraisal system with farmers 
(CPC2). 
The farmers establish and maintain the performance 
appraisal system with the company (FPC2). 
The company improves the production process 
with farmers to better meet each other’s needs 
(CPC3). 
The farmers will improve the production process with 




The cooperation improves the quality of the 
products (CQP1). 
The cooperation improves the quality of the products 
(FQP1). 
Huo et al. (2014);  
Fu et al. (2017) 
The cooperation reduces the production cost of 
the products (CQP2). 
The cooperation reduces the production cost of the 
products (FQP2). 
The cooperation reduces the investment of fixed 
assets (CQP3). 
The cooperation reduces the investment of fixed assets 
(FQP3). 
Such alliance reduces the needs of capital 
investment (CQP4). 
The cooperation reduces capital investment (FQP4). 
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3.2. Data collection 
Both the firm-level data and farm-level data were collected by email and through face-
to-face interviews in the Hainan province in China, to study contract farming as a system 
influenced by agricultural industrialisation. The data collected identifies some of the 
essential features of the participants in contract farming, perceived satisfaction regarding 
the collaboration and various types of contractual relationships being established. In total, 
500 questionnaires were distributed to farmers and 321 valid questionnaires were 
received with an effective response rate of 64.2%. Of 280 questionnaires distributed to 
companies, 78 valid questionnaires were received, with an effective response rate of 
27.9%. 
 
Table 2 shows the fundamental characteristics of the companies. There are 78 agricultural 
companies. Of these, 76.9% cooperate with 500 farmers or less, 70.5% of the companies 
have cooperation times of less than 10 years and 64.1% are private companies. In terms 
of the collaboration relationship, 26.9% of the companies believe that the cooperation 
performance with farmers was not stable, 37.2% believe that trust has developed between 
the two, 33.3% believe that a long-term relationship has been established between the two 




Table 2: Basic Characteristics of Companies 
Variable Variable value n=78 
Frequency Percentage 
Number of cooperative 
farmers 
(0, 50] 8 10.26 
(50, 100] 22 28.21 
(100, 500] 30 38.46 
(500, 1000] 4 5.13 
above 1000 12 15.38 
missing data 2 2.56 
Cooperation time 
(years) 
(0, 1] 4 5.13 
(1, 3] 10 12.82 
(3, 5] 13 16.67 
(5, 10] 28 35.90 
Above ten years 18 23.08 
Missing data 5 6.41 
Ownership State owned 0 0 
Collective 2 2.56 
Joint venture 8 10.26 
Private 50 64.10 
Others 14 17.95 
Missing data 4 5.13 
Cooperation stage Unstable cooperation performance 21 26.92 
Trust has reached a certain level 29 37.18 
Have established a long-term 
relationship 
26 33.33 
Becoming dissatisfied with the 
cooperation 
2 2.56 
Have ended the cooperation or is in the 
process of ending it 
0 0 
Missing data 0 0 
 
Table 3 shows the fundamental characteristics of farmers. The total number of farmer 
samples is 321. The age of the farmers is mainly between 30 and 50 years old, accounting 
for 52.3% and the number of farmers under 30 is 11.53%. The sample shows that 
cooperation between farmers and companies is still in its infancy. Cooperation times of 
less than three years account for 41.1%, indicating that most of the farmers surveyed are 
still at a relatively preliminary stage, and they are still in the process of developing mutual 
understanding. Of the farmers, 44.2% indicated that they had reached a certain level of 









(0, 30) 37 11.53 
(30, 40] 80 24.92 
(40, 50] 88 27.41 
above 50 72 22.43 




(0, 1] 68 21.18 
(1, 3] 64 19.94 
(3, 5] 55 17.13 
Above five years 35 10.90 
Missing data 99 30.84 
Cooperation 
stage 
Unstable cooperation performance 33 10.28 
Trust has reached a certain level 142 44.24 
Have established a long-term relationship 55 17.13 
Becoming dissatisfied with the cooperation 4 1.25 
Have ended the cooperation or is in the process 
of ending it 
11 3.43 
Missing data 76 23.68 
    
4. Analysis and results 
4.1. Reliability and validity analysis 
This study conducted confirmatory factor analysis to test reliability and validity with 
SPSS 24.0 and Smart PLS 2.0. It used Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability (CR) 
to test reliability. Table 4 and Table 5 show the results. The findings of the confirmatory 
factor analysis display that the items loaded significantly on their respective constructs. 
The overall model fit and item loadings indicate acceptable unidimensional for the 
measures (Bentler and Weeks, 1980; Cohen et al., 1990). In terms of reliability, the 
Cronbach’s alpha values of constructs are all above 0.6 (except for that of economic 
power of company, which is slightly less than 0.60 (0.598)). In addition, the CR values 
range from 0.791 to 0.900, which indicates overall acceptable reliability of the model 
(Flynn et al., 1990; Wasko and Faraj, 2005). In terms of validity, it is measured by 
convergent validity and discriminant validity (Flynn et al., 1990; Raubenheimer, 2004). 
An average variance extracted (AVE) value higher than 0.5 indicates that the construct 
has favourable convergence validity. If the square root of the AVE of each construct is 
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higher than the correlation coefficient of other constructs, the scale has discriminant 
validity. From the results shown in Tables 4 and 5, the AVE values of constructs are all 
greater than 0.5. In addition, the AVE square root of each construct (bold numbers in a 
diagonal line in Table 6 and Table 7) are higher than the corresponding correlation 
coefficients (values in the non-diagonal line in Tables 6 and 7). Overall, given the above 
information, the data represents good reliability, convergent and discriminant validity.  
Table 4: Reliability and convergent validity analysis of companies 
Constructs Items Loadings Cronbach’s 
alpha 
CR AVE 
Non-economic power CNP1 0.870 0.720 0.844 0.644 
CNP2 0.804    
CNP3 0.728    
Economic power CEP1 0.583 0.598 0.791 0.564 
CEP2 0.765    
CEP3 0.875    
Information sharing CIS1 0.842 0.833 0.900 0.750 
CIS2 0.845    
CIS3 0.910    
Process coordination CPC1 0.819 0.764 0.864 0.679 
CPC2 0.819    
CPC3 0.834    
Quality performance of agricultural 
products 
CQP1 0.818 0.802 0.871 0.630 
CQP2 0.675    
CQP3 0.869    




Table 5: Reliability and convergent validity analysis of farmers 
Constructs Items Loadings Cronbach’s 
alpha 
CR AVE 
Non-economic power FNP1 0.713 0.660 0.810 0.589 
FNP2 0.828    
FNP3 0.757    
Economic power FEP1 0.716 0.780 0.873 0.698 
FEP2 0.882    
FEP3 0.897    
Information sharing FIS1 0.816 0.715 0.840 0.637 
FIS2 0.818    
FIS3 0.759    
Process coordination FPC1 0.860 0.786 0.875 0.701 
FPC2 0.835    
FPC3 0.815    
Quality performance of agricultural 
products 
FQP1 0.658 0.760 0.845 0.579 
FQP2 0.829    
FQP3 0.797    
FQP4 0.749    
 
Table 6: Discriminant validity analysis of companies 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Non-economic power 0.803      
2. Economic power -0.409  0.751     
3. Information sharing 0.735  -0.413  0.866    
4. Process coordination 0.782  -0.608  0.737  0.824   




Table 7: Discriminant validity analysis of farmers 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Non-economic power 0.767      
2. Economic power 0.105  0.836     
3. Information sharing 0.235  -0.100  0.798    
4. Process coordination 0.284  0.020  0.542  0.837   
5. Quality performance of agricultural products 0.391  0.149  0.358  0.379  0.761  
 
4.2. Structural equation modelling and results 
This study applied Smart PLS 2.0 to test the proposed theoretical model empirically. 

















Note: * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001 

















Note: * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001 




The results show that a significant, positive relationship exists between non-economic 
power and information sharing (companies’ perspective: β = 0.680, p < 0.001; farmers’ 
perspective: β = 0.248, p < 0.001), which indicates a positive effect of non-economic 
power on information sharing from both companies’ and farmers’ perspectives. Thus, H1 
was supported. Also, the results show that the positive relationship between non-
economic power and process coordination is also significant (companies’ perspective: β 
= 0.641, p < 0.001; farmers’ perspective: β = 0.285, p < 0.001) for both companies and 
farmers. Hence, H2 was confirmed. 
 
The results also show the relationship between economic power and contract farming for 
supply chain integration. From the companies’ perspective, the negative relationship 
between economic power and information sharing (β = -0.135, p <0.01) is significant, 
indicating that H3 was supported. A significant, negative relationship exists between 
economic power and process coordination (β = -0.346, p <0.001), which supports H4. 
From the farmers’ perspective, a significant, negative relationship exists between 
economic power and information sharing (β = -0.126, p < 0.01), indicating support for 
H3. A negative relationship exists between economic power and process coordination (β 
= -0.010, p >0.05), which contradicts H4. 
 
In terms of the relationship between contract farming for supply chain integration and 
quality performance of agricultural products, the results indicate that from the farmers’ 
perspective, a positive relationship exists between information sharing and quality 
performance of agricultural products (β = 0.216, p < 0.001). This supports H5. However, 
from the companies’ perspective, the positive relationship between information sharing 
and quality performance of agricultural products (β = 0.054, p >0.05) is not significant, 
contradicting H5. Last, a positive relationship exists between process coordination and 
quality performance of agricultural products from both the companies’ and farmers’ 
perspectives (companies’ perspective: β = 0.707, p < 0.001; farmers’ perspective: β = 












H1: non-economic power → information 
sharing (+) 
22.349 Supported 5.884 Supported 
H2: non-economic power → process 
coordination (+) 
25.169 Supported 5.983 Supported 
H3: economic power → information sharing 
(-) 
3.031 Supported  2.904 Supported 
H4: economic power → process coordination 
(-) 
9.062 Supported 0.171 Rejected 
H5: information sharing → quality 
performance of agricultural products (+) 
0.990 Rejected 4.199 Supported 
H5: process coordination → quality 
performance of agricultural products (+) 
16.438 Supported 5.309 Supported 
 
5. Discussion and managerial implications 
5.1. The effect of power on contract farming for supply chain integration 
The results show that non-economic power has a significant, positive effect on contract 
farming for supply chain integration. This means that the use of non-economic power can 
enhance information sharing and process coordination between farmers and companies. 
This is different from the empirical results of Zhao et al. (2008). Particularly, Zhao et al. 
(2008) examined the effect of power and relationship commitment on supply chain 
integration. They focused on manufacturing companies and mainly investigated the 
relationship between manufacturers and customers in supply chains. Their results imply 
that expert power and referent power in non-economic powers can positively affect 
customer integration by positively affecting normative relationship commitments. 
However, legal power in non-economic power does not significantly affect customer 
integration. This inconsistency can be explained. First, the industry being researched is 
different. Zhao et al. (2008) chose the manufacturing industry as their research object, but 
the object of this study is agriculture. Moreover, the objects of the study differ in terms 
of power. In the context of the buyers’ market, Zhao et al. (2008) chose customers as 
objects, which was a relatively strong side. However, the objects of this study are farmers 
and companies. The farmers are on a weaker side, compared with the companies. Further, 
Zhao et al. (2008) identified the relationship between manufacturer and customers and 
cooperation between companies. In the contract farming context, the relationship between 
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farmers and companies exists between several farmers and one company, which is a 
many-to-one relationship. Therefore, in the process of cooperation, the use of non-
economic power will promote supply chain integration between companies and farmers. 
 
In addition, these research findings show that economic power has different effects on 
contract farming for supply chain integration from a binary perspective. From the 
farmers’ perspective, a company’s use of economic power has a significant, negative 
effect on information sharing and has no significant effect on the process coordination 
between the farmer-company relationships in a supply chain. From the companies’ 
perspective, the empirical results indicate that farmers using economic power have a 
significant negative effect on process coordination and information sharing in the farmer-
company relationship. The finding of the relationship between economic power and 
farmers–companies relationships for supply chain integration contradicts the findings of 
Brown et al. (1995), who suggest that power is somewhat balanced between suppliers and 
retailers. This might be because of cultural differences (Yeung et al., 2009; Maloni and 
Benton, 2000). Moreover, the finding further extends the studies of Prajogo and Olhager 
(2012) and Zhao et al. (2008). For example, Zhao et al. (2008) indicate that economic 
power has an indirect, positive influence on customer integration through instrumental 
relationship commitments. There are two main reasons for these differences. Process 
coordination is generally led by the company and farmers occupy the integrated position 
(Liu et al., 2015). Even if the farmers do not like the company using economic power, 
they submit to humiliation. Farmers have to continue to engage in process coordination 
with companies because they have no choice of whether to participate in the process of 
coordination. In addition, because farmers are in a weak position, when they use 
economic power the company with a strong position does not care (Frazier et al. 1986; 
Benton and Maloni, 2005). Instead of being influenced by the farmers, the company will 
be reluctant to share information with farmers. Therefore, for long-term cooperation, 
companies and farmers should avoid the use of economic power that could make one 
party not share information with the other party, as it would be adverse to the 
improvement of quality performance. 
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5.2. Improving quality performance of agricultural products through contract 
farming 
From farmers’ perspectives, empirical results show that the use of contract farming for 
supply chain integration has a significant, positive effect on quality performance of 
agricultural products for both farmers and companies. It indicates that supply chain 
management requires both process coordination and information sharing and should not 
restrict itself to only one of these aspects. This is consistent with the conclusions of Huo 
et al. (2014), Prajogo and Olhager (2012) and Fu et al. (2017), but inconsistent with Swink 
et al. (2007), who found that integration with suppliers has a negative effect on quality 
performance. Form companies' perspectives, the results indicate that only process 
coordination promotes quality performance, but information sharing does not. This is 
consistent with prior studies such as Van der Vaart and van Donk, (2008), Frohlich and 
Westbrook (2001) and Li et al. (2009), who performed research in various contexts and 
identified a positive relationship between process coordination and performance 
outcomes of supply chains. Moreover, according to Moye and Langfred (2004), 
information sharing might exacerbate project conflict and relationship conflict within the 
company, through opposition in suggestions and opinions, and have a negative effect on 
the quality performance of the products. Further, from farmers' perspectives, process 
coordination has a more significant effect on the quality performance of agricultural 
products than information sharing. This indicates that the effect of information sharing is 
time-sensitive, the cycle of the influence of process coordination is relatively long and 
the degree of impact is relatively deep (Liu et al., 2005; Prajogo and Olhager. 2012). 
Therefore, for long-term cooperation with farmers, if the aim is to enhance quality 
performance of agricultural products, companies should first highlight the importance of 
process coordination, then, while perfecting process coordination, turn their attention to 
information sharing. 
6. Conclusions and future research 
This study empirically investigated the relationships between different types of power, 
supply chain integration and quality performance of agricultural products in contract 
farming. To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine these 
relationships using data collected from both companies and farmers in Chinese 
agricultural supply chains. China’s unique national culture and fast increasing 
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agribusiness base allow this study to extend the existing literature and offers important, 
practical implications for both supply chain practitioners and scholars.  
 
Further, this research selected China as a particular case for the following reasons. First, 
unlike other developing economies, such as Africa and Latin America, which have been 
open to foreign markets since the 1970s, China does not have a long tradition of contract 
farming (Guo et al., 2007). This offers a great chance to study how the adoption of 
contract farming affects development. Second, China has a substantial agricultural market 
and recently founded companies to serve the market. In addition, the number of small and 
low-income farmers in China is tremendous (Zhang and Aramyan, 2009). Third, China 
has a powerful government defined by collectivism and high power distance. As such, it 
is a unique context for exploring issues associated with different types of power and 
contract farming for supply chain integration (Zhao et al., 2008). Given these reasons, 
although there may be heterogeneity across different contexts regarding the adoption of 
contract farming, the results generated from this research are generalisable to other 
developing countries and can contribute to the existing literature, which mostly focuses 
on developed economies (Igata et al., 2008; Warning and Hoo, 2000; Glover and 
Kusterer, 2016). These results can generate fruitful implications for contract farming in 
developing economies. 
6.1. Theoretical contributions 
The theoretical contributions of this research are reflected in the following three aspects. 
First, this study analyses how two types of power affect contract farming for supply chain 
integration and enrich the relevant literature surrounding power in one-to-many 
relationships. Power remains an important yet overlooked element in contract farming. 
Thus, the unique attributes of power within supply chain integration continue to be 
ambiguous (Podsakoff and Schriescheim, 1985; Yeung et al., 2009). Many companies do 
not fully acknowledge the different types of power and subsequently cannot effectively 
engage their own power bases (Mast, 2010). Accordingly, this study complements the 
literature and identifies that proper use of different types of power (i.e. non-economic and 
economic power) can significantly enhance contract farming for supply chain integration 




Second, the intensive competition in agribusiness means that the supply chain has rapidly 
become vertically integrated with developing economies, with contract farming as the 
key integration approach for most agri-products grown for regional and global food 
consumption (Ariffin et al., 2015; Zainol et al., 2019). Studies show that risk reduction 
and transaction cost reduction are the two main reasons for contract farming (Krishnan et 
al., 2004; Lehoux et al., 2014). However, this study identified another important reason 
for contract farming—improved product quality. In particular, it investigated how the two 
dimensions of contract farming for supply chain integration affect the quality 
performance of agricultural products and it enriches the literature by identifying the effect 
of different types of supply chain integration on the quality performance of agricultural 
products, in the contract farming context. 
 
Finally, this study adopts two independent studies to gain a comprehensive understanding 
of the perspectives of both companies and farmers. As the two parties have different 
objectives and operations, relying on a single perspective can lead to inconsistencies in 
the research findings (Guo et al., 2007; Niu et al., 2016). Therefore, this study extends 
the existing literature surrounding contract farming from both farmers’ perspectives 
(Dada et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2013b; Saenger et al., 2013) and companies’ perspectives 
(Krishnan et al. 2004; Sartorious and Kirsten, 2007; Chiu et al., 2011), and examines 
contract farming, as a system, from both perspectives. 
6.2. Managerial Implications 
Today, the growing requirement for improved quality of agricultural products in 
developing countries is significantly changing traditional agricultural markets (Otsuka et 
al., 2016). The transformations in agricultural business (the so-called ‘agricultural 
industrialisation’) brought about a requirement for higher degrees of controlled 
collaboration (Matos and Hall, 2007). Accordingly, one widely embraced approach is 
contract farming, which generates guarantees – necessary for sustaining the continuous 
operations of vulnerable farmers – while enabling manufacturers to manage the aggregate 
supply chain risks and prices. In this way, agricultural product processing 
manufacturers—hereafter referred to as ‘companies’—collaborate with famers from 
relatively small and financially challenged farms (Wang et al., 2014). According to 
Baluch et al. (2017), companies and distributors, who are searching for efficient and novel 
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approaches to obtaining good-quality raw material, are broadly applying contract farming 
as a new way to manage supply chain relations. Thus, contract farming can enable a wide 
range of incentive practices, such as quality evaluation, the use of input monitors, 
incentive pay and field visits, all of which aim to improve the quality of agricultural 
products (Krishnan et al., 2004; Datta, 2017). 
 
The results of this study have the following managerial implications for agricultural 
companies and farmers. Above all, companies and farmers should be aware of the 
importance of contract farming for quality performance of agricultural products. Quality 
performance can be further enhanced by improving process coordination and information 
sharing efforts. In particular, the results suggest that companies should actively guide 
farmers to participate in process coordination and multilaterally expand information 
communication channels with them. This objective can be realised through initiatives 
such as training sessions, forums and event conferences, deployment of technicians to 
visit farmers on a regular basis and the establishment of a championship system to 
encourage information exchange among farmers (Moye and Langford, 2004; Prajogo and 
Olhager, 2012). It would also be beneficial for farmers to join the channels provided by 
the company, as it is an effective way to improve product quality performance to meet 
the standards set by the company. 
 
Moreover, companies and farmers should be aware that different applications of power 
have various effects on contract farming for supply chain integration. The use of non-
economic power should be strengthened to promote supply chain integration between 
farmers and companies. This can be achieved by allowing farmers to recognise a 
company’s expertise, special skills or knowledge and encouraging them to cooperate with 
that company through multiple, technical training courses (Brown et al., 1995; Maloni 
and Benton, 2000). Regular or occasional events and conferences that emphasise the 
common and long-term goals of cooperation with farmers, while cultivating the common 
values of both parties, would increase a sense of identity that includes one another. In 
contrast, companies and farmers should minimise the use of economic power because it 
is not conducive to information sharing, the improved quality performance of agricultural 
products or sustainable agricultural development. This is especially important for 
farmers, as the use of economic power will reduce the willingness of both parties to 
coordinate the process, which is not conducive to sustainable agricultural development. 
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6.3. Limitations and Future Research 
However, there are also several limitations and opportunities for future research. First, 
multicultural studies should be added in the future to accommodate the different cultures 
in other countries. According to Yeung et al. (2009), in a high power distance national 
culture, such as China, there is a recognition of power inequalities. For example, 
individuals may anticipate that decisions will be made by powerful parties and might feel 
uncomfortable otherwise (Benton and Maloni, 2005). Non-economic power relies on the 
perception of the type of power itself, rather than its performance, so this study anticipates 
that it will be powerful in China, where perceived diversities in power are considered 
significant (Zhao et al., 2008). In addition, high power distance national cultures are more 
likely to be receptive to the adoption of economic power because it requires less 
legitimisation in such a culture (Yeung et al., 2009). Given the fact that this study 
collected its data from the region of Hainan, China. Data from different regions should 
also be collected to further explore and verify the relationships. Second, the role of power 
in supply chain integration should be subdivided into different types of non-economic 
and economic powers that can affect contract farming for supply chain integration more 
explicitly. This study used cross-sectional data and unilateral data to test the proposed 
model. Longitudinal data could be used in future research to provide an in-depth view of 
the relationships between power, supply chain integration and quality performance in 
contract farming. 
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Contract Farming Between companies and farmers Questionnaire: To companies 
 
Introduction: 
This survey aims to study the collaboration stability of contract farming between companies and farmers. 
Please answer all of the questions to the best of your knowledge. In the questionnaire, company refers to 
the company that forms alliance with farmers within the People's Republic of China. Please circle the 
numbers that best describe your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the statements below. The 
information gathered will be kept confidential and only used for research purpose. If you have any question 
about this survey or have something to inquire, please get in touch with: College of Economic and 
Management, South China Agricultural University, Fu Shaoling; E-mail: lfbfu@scau.edu.cn 
 
Section 1: Basic Information 
For the purpose of statistical study, please answer the following questions regarding your basic information. 
1. The full name of the interviewed company: 
2. Company address:  
3. How many farmers does your company cooperate with? 
  (1). (0,50] 
  (2). (50,100] 
  (3). (100,500] 
  (4). (500,1000] 
  (5). above 1000 
4. How long have your company been cooperating with the farmers? 
  (1). (0,1]  
  (2). (1,3] 
  (3). (3,5] 
  (4). (5,10] 
  (5). Above ten years 
5. The business nature of your company： 
  (1). state-owned business  
  (2). collectively-owned enterprise 
  (3). Sino-foreign joint venture  
  (4). private enterprise  
  (5). other, please state_______ 
6. How do you describe the current stage of your alliance (select one of the answers from below)? 
  (1). Both cooperation parties are exploring and testing the consistency of their goals, sincerity, and the 
alliance performance is not stable. 
  (2). Both cooperation parties are benefitting from the increasing profits as a result of the relationship. Both 
parties trust each other to a certain degree and are satisfied with the outcome, and thus would like to 
make further effort to establish long term relationship 
  (3). Both parties have established continuous and long-term relationship and have been obtaining 
satisfactory results. 
  (4). One or both parties becomes discontented with the cooperation and plans to end the relationship, seek 
for other partners, and start to express that the cooperation relationship is over. 
  (5). Both parties start negotiations to end the cooperation, or have been taking actions to actually terminate 
the relationship.  
 
Section 2: Construct Measurement 












The farmers understand what they are 
doing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The business knowledge of the farmers 
is likely to make the farmers do the 
right thing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The farmers have received specialised 
training and can recognise and take 
necessary actions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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If the company does not comply with 
the requirements of farmers, the 
company will not be treated well by 
them 
       
If the farmers find that the company 
does not follow their requirements, the 
farmers will retaliate in some way 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The farmers often imply that if the 
company does not meet their 
requirements, the farmers will take 
some actions to reduce the company’s 
profits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 












The company monitors the 
production process together with 
farmers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The company establishes and 
maintains the performance appraisal 
system with farmers  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The company improves the 
production process with farmers to 
better meet each other’s needs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The company shares sales 
information with the farmers  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The company shares the inventory 
information of products with the 
farmers in the process of planting and 
breeding  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The company shares the production 
planning information with the 
farmers in the process of planting and 
breeding  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 












The cooperation improves the 
quality of the products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The cooperation reduces the 
production cost of the products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The cooperation reduces the 
investment of fixed assets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Such alliance reduces the needs 
of capital investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 







Contract Farming Between companies and farmers Questionnaire: To farmers 
 
Introduction: 
This survey aims to study the collaboration stability of contract farming between companies and farmers. 
Please answer all of the questions to the best of your knowledge. In the questionnaire, company refers to 
the company that forms alliance with farmers within the People's Republic of China. Please circle the 
numbers that best describe your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the statements below. The 
information gathered will be kept confidential and only used for research purpose. If you have any question 
about this survey or have something to inquire, please get in touch with: College of Economic and 
Management, South China Agricultural University, Fu Shaoling; E-mail: lfbfu@scau.edu.cn 
 
Section 1: Basic Information 
For the purpose of statistical study, please answer the following questions regarding your basic information.  
1. Your full address:  




(4). above 50 
3. How long have you been cooperating with the company (Years)? 
(1). (0,1]  
(2). (1,3] 
(3). (3,5] 
(4). Above five years 
4. How do you describe the current stage of your alliance (select one of the answers from below)? 
(1). Both cooperation parties are exploring and testing the consistency of their goals, sincerity, and the 
alliance performance is not stable  
(2). Both cooperation parties are benefitting from the increasing profits as a result of the relationship. 
Both parties trust each other to a certain degree and are satisfied with the outcome, and thus would 
like to make further effort to establish long term relationship 
(3). Both parties have established continuous and long-term relationship and have been obtaining 
satisfactory results. 
(4). One or both parties become discontented with the cooperation and plans to end the relationship, 
seek for other partners, and start to express that the cooperation relationship is over. 
(5). Both parties start negotiations to end the cooperation, or have been taking actions to actually 
terminate the relationship.  
 
Section 2: Construct Measurement 












The company understands what it is 
doing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business knowledge may make the 
company suggest to do things right 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The company has received specialised 
training and can recognise and take 
necessary actions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If the farmers did not do what as the 
company asked, the farmers would 
not have received very good treatment 
from the company 
       
If the company found that the farmers 
do not obey it, the company will 
retaliate in some way 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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The company often hints that if the 
farmers do not obey it, it will take 
some actions to reduce the farmers’ 
profits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  












The farmers monitor the production 
process together with the company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The farmers establish and maintain the 
performance appraisal system with the 
company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The farmers will improve the 
production process with the company to 
better meet each other’s needs  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The farmers share sales information 
with the company  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The farmers share inventory 
information with the company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The farmers share the plan information 
of means of production (chemical 
fertiliser, pesticides, veterinary drugs, 
feed, etc.) with the company in the 
process of planting and breeding 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 












The cooperation improves the 
quality of the products. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The cooperation reduces the 
production cost of the products. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The cooperation reduces the 
investment of fixed assets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The cooperation reduces capital 
investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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